fix(kyberforge): bridge apm content to Claude Code's flat plugin discovery
Claude Code's (and Copilot's) native plugin installer has zero awareness of .apm/ nesting -- it convention-scans only flat skills/, agents/, commands/, hooks.json at each plugin's root. Confirmed via strings on the installed claude binary and live installs of git@holocron/gitea@holocron/kyberforge@ holocron, all reporting Skills(0) Agents(0) Hooks(0) post ADR-0015's apm conversion. Root cause (apm_cli/core/plugin_manifest.py): apm's plugin.json compiler deliberately strips skills/agents/commands keys, assuming the host already auto-discovers those convention directories -- it has no model of .apm/ being host-visible at all. Separately, apm's own bundle exporter (apm_cli/bundle/plugin_exporter.py, behind `apm pack --format plugin`) implements the correct .apm/ -> flat mapping, but only ever targeted build/<name>-<version>/, a path nothing in marketplace.json's source: points at. scripts/sync-plugin-content.sh wraps that bundle exporter and copies its agents/, skills/, commands/, instructions/, extensions/, and merged hooks.json back into each plugin's own root as a second tracked compiled-output category -- same governance status as .claude-plugin/plugin.json: generated from .apm/, never hand-edited. tests/ subdirectories are excluded from the mirror (dev fixtures, not host-visible runtime content; several hardcode a relative repo-root walk-up sized for the .apm/-nested depth, which breaks when duplicated one level shallower). Applied for real across all 6 plugins and verified two ways: `claude plugin validate --strict` passes on every real plugin directory, and a live `claude --plugin-dir <path> -p "list skills/agents"` behavioral test confirms content is now actually discovered. Also, from the same issue #90 review round: - scripts/check-manifests.sh pointed at each plugin's root-level plugin.json (checking skills/hooks/mcpServers/agents pointer fields) -- that file was a stale near-duplicate of .claude-plugin/plugin.json nothing else read or wrote, now deleted across all 6 plugins. check-manifests.sh is rewritten to validate .claude-plugin/plugin.json instead, and drops the pointer-field checks entirely (nothing to check -- those fields are correctly absent by design). Content-presence drift is now check-plugin-content-sync's job, a new pre-push hook wired in .pre-commit-config.yaml. docs/adr/0017 records the root cause and decision in full, including two rejected alternatives (patching plugin.json's path fields directly -- apm's compiler strips them on every run; pointing marketplace.json at apm pack's build/ output -- a version-suffixed non-source directory nothing can install from without an extra build step). ADR-0015 and CONTEXT.md are updated to point at it. Refs: #90
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plugins/gitea/skills/gitea-files/SKILL.md
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plugins/gitea/skills/gitea-files/SKILL.md
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---
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name: gitea-files
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description: >
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Use when reading or writing individual files or directory trees in a Gitea repository via the
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Gitea MCP server: reading a file's contents, listing a directory, walking a full repository
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tree, creating a new file, updating an existing file, or deleting a file. Triggers on "read this
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file from the repo", "what's in this directory", "show me the repo tree", "create/update a file
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in Gitea", "commit this file to the branch", "delete this file from the repo" — even when the
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user doesn't say "Gitea" explicitly, as long as the target is a Gitea-hosted repository. Do not
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use for local filesystem file operations (use Read/Write/Edit), for branch or commit history
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(use gitea-branches), or for opening a pull request around a file change (use gitea-prs after
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the file write completes here).
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compatibility: Requires the Gitea MCP server configured with a token scoped to at least
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write:repository. Tested with a token holding write:issue + write:repository; write:issue
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is not actually required for any of this domain's five tools.
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metadata:
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category: gitea
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source_keys:
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- gitea-mcp-repo
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- gitea-mcp-slim-go
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- context7-websites-gitea
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allowed-tools: mcp__gitea__get_file_contents mcp__gitea__get_dir_contents mcp__gitea__get_repository_tree mcp__gitea__create_or_update_file mcp__gitea__delete_file
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---
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## Gotchas
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- **A 404 from any read call may actually be a 403 in disguise.** `get_file_contents`, `get_dir_contents`, and `get_repository_tree` all gate on `write:repository` scope, not just read access — some Gitea endpoints return 404 instead of 403 when the token's scope is insufficient, to avoid leaking whether the resource exists. If a read fails with 404 on a path you're confident is correct, check the token's configured scopes before concluding the file or directory doesn't exist.
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- **SHA is the concurrency token for every write — and it lives at the top level of `get_file_contents`'s response, not nested under `content`.** `create_or_update_file` without `sha` is always treated as a *create*: if the path already exists, Gitea returns HTTP 409. `delete_file` has no optional path at all — omitting `sha` returns HTTP 422. The safe sequence for any update or delete is always: call `get_file_contents` first, read the top-level `sha` field, then pass that exact value to the write call. Never guess or reuse a stale SHA — a mismatched SHA is rejected the same as a missing one.
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- **A write can also fail because the branch requires signed commits — a separate failure mode from a bad SHA.** `create_or_update_file` and `delete_file` create commits server-side via a bare API token call with no 2FA/PGP context. If the target branch's protection rule requires signed commits, Gitea rejects the write outright — surfaced as a generic 403 or 422, not an error naming "signed commit required," and reads against that same branch keep succeeding right up until you try to write. When a write fails without a clean 409 (missing/stale SHA) or 404 (bad path) explanation, check whether the branch's protection rule requires signed commits before assuming the SHA is wrong and retrying.
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- **A large `create_or_update_file` payload can hit a reverse-proxy 413 that has nothing to do with Gitea.** `content` is base64-encoded, which inflates the payload ~33% over the raw file size; a 413 is commonly a reverse-proxy body-size limit in front of the Gitea instance, not a Gitea-side rejection. No amount of retrying, or changing the SHA, path, or branch, will fix it — it needs the proxy's config raised, which is outside this skill's or the calling agent's control. Surface that distinction to the user instead of retrying the same call.
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- **`get_dir_contents` and `get_repository_tree` are not SHA sources for a specific file's write.** `get_dir_contents` entries carry no `sha` at all. `get_repository_tree` entries do carry a `sha` (a blob/tree hash), but fetching it means an extra round trip with no content — `get_file_contents` is the canonical path since it returns the decoded content and the write-ready `sha` in one call.
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- **`owner` and `repo` are always caller-supplied inputs, never resolved here.** This skill doesn't infer them from a git remote. If invoked directly by a human, ask for them if not stated. If invoked by `gitea-workflow` or an orchestrating agent, expect them to already be resolved and passed in.
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- **Direct commits to a branch are a first-class action, not a workaround.** Gitea's own web UI defaults to editing files directly against a branch — `create_or_update_file`/`delete_file` used that way is normal, not an API escape hatch to avoid. The SHA-currency requirement above is the actual risk to manage, not the act of committing directly.
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- **`ref` (reads) vs. `branch_name` (writes) are different parameters for the same concept.** `get_file_contents`, `get_dir_contents`, and `get_repository_tree` (as `tree_sha`) all accept a branch name, tag, or commit SHA to select what to read. `create_or_update_file` and `delete_file` instead take `branch_name` — the branch the commit lands on. Don't conflate the two when chaining a read into a write.
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- **Content is base64.** `create_or_update_file`'s `content` parameter is base64-encoded file content, not raw text — encode before calling. `get_file_contents`'s response content is likewise base64-encoded (decode after reading), unless `withLines: true` is passed for a numbered-line view.
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## Reading
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- **Single file:** `get_file_contents(owner, repo, ref, path)`. Pass `withLines: true` only when you need line numbers for referencing specific lines (e.g. quoting a snippet back to the user); omit it for a normal content fetch.
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- **One directory level:** `get_dir_contents(owner, repo, ref, path)` — returns immediate entries only (name, path, type, size), no recursion, no SHA, no content.
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- **Whole tree:** `get_repository_tree(owner, repo, tree_sha, recursive)` — `tree_sha` accepts a SHA, branch, or tag name despite the name. Set `recursive: true` to walk subdirectories in one call. Response includes `truncated: true` when a page doesn't hold every entry — page through with `page`/`per_page` (default `page: 1`, `per_page: 30`) until you get fewer results than `per_page`.
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## Writing
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- **Creating a new file:** call `create_or_update_file(owner, repo, path, content, message, branch_name)` with `sha` omitted entirely.
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- **Updating an existing file:** call `get_file_contents(owner, repo, ref: branch_name, path)` first, take the top-level `sha`, then call `create_or_update_file(..., sha: <that value>)`.
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- **Deleting a file:** call `get_file_contents` first the same way, then `delete_file(owner, repo, path, message, branch_name, sha: <that value>)` — `sha` is required, no create-style fallback exists.
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- **Creating a new branch as part of the write:** pass `new_branch_name` on `create_or_update_file` to branch off before the commit lands, instead of calling a separate branch-creation step.
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If the change needs review before merging, or targets a protected branch, hand off to `gitea-prs` after the write lands here to open the pull request — this skill's scope ends at the commit.
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If you need the full multi-call sequence rather than the single-call summary above — e.g. branching off as part of a file push ahead of opening a PR, or recovering a SHA you didn't capture earlier — read `references/examples.md`.
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