docs: correct the claims this review found false

AGENTS.md told an offline agent to push with SKIP=apm-marketplace-check and
asserted that hook was "the only one whose failure mode is 'no network'".
Running all 12 pre-push hooks under a network namespace shows two fail, for
one shared cause: apm-pack-check-clean resolves the same remote entry. An
exact pin does not remove the ls-remote, so both hooks are named now.

AGENTS.md also said everything in a plugin root except .apm/ is generated.
Plugin roots carry hand-authored README.md, docs/, bin/, sources.md and
.mcp.json, so an agent would hunt for an .apm/ source that does not exist or
refuse the edit. The rule is positional: immunity belongs to the plugin root,
and anything inside a mirrored directory is still rm -rf'd.

ADR-0017 said apm strips a hooks field. The real loop is (agents, skills,
commands, instructions) -- hooks absent, instructions never mentioned -- and
it can never fire, because synthesize_plugin_json_from_apm_yml only emits the
eight identity fields. The decision stands; the mechanism was overstated. Its
mcpServers amendment is rewritten for the pointer payload and now records the
real reason: inlining bypassed apm's credential sanitizer.

ADR-0015's owner.email and version-pin passages are corrected against the apm
source, and ADR-0016 gains the disallowedTools amendment. agent-audit's
allowlist is data, so it gains disallowedTools too -- the ADR and the
validator that enforces it had come apart.

architecture.md described a root CLAUDE.md that imports two files (it imports
one, plus an RTK block) and pointed at an ADR index that does not exist.
Seven skill READMEs listed tests/ files the mirror strips, promising installed
users files their install lacks; those rows are marked source-only, with the
depth-4 template tests explicitly called out as surviving. And
plugins/kyberforge/hooks/README.md, deleted during the conversion and
preserved nowhere, is restored to a path the mirror does not own -- verified
by running a sync against a scratch copy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X7GvKuJfy2WrdBmUttV4DT

plugins/kyberforge/.apm/skills/agent-audit/SKILL.md

@@ -44,13 +44,13 @@ The script accepts either the CC file, the Copilot file, or (at plugin/APM scope
 
 At **project/user scope** it derives the counterpart and runs the existing pair-based checks. Note FAILs and SUGGESTIONs for the `### Structure` and `### Provider safety` report dimensions. Findings about missing fields, bad name format, empty body, or missing frontmatter → `### Structure`. Findings about CC-only fields in a Copilot file, Copilot-only fields in a CC file, body length, or subagent-unavailable tools → `### Provider safety`. A missing counterpart file → `### Pair consistency`.
 
-At **plugin/APM scope** there is no counterpart — the script instead checks the single file's frontmatter against the `apm-agent-allowlist` in `references/field-inventory.md` (`name`, `description`, `model`, `source_keys` — nothing else; `source_keys` is provenance metadata, not a provider-specific field, and is validated separately by `validate-provenance.sh` against `sources.md`). Findings about missing fields, bad name format, name/filename-stem mismatch, empty body, or missing frontmatter → `### Structure`, same as project/user scope. Findings about any field outside the allowlist (e.g. `tools`, or any Claude-only/Copilot-only field carried over from a hand-edit) and body length → `### Provider safety` — but the dimension's meaning shifts here: it is no longer a CC-vs-Copilot field-leakage check, it's a vendor-neutral-field-allowlist check, since `apm compile` verbatim-copies this file's frontmatter to every target and there is no per-target integrator to reconcile a CC-only or Copilot-only field (ADR-0016). `### Pair consistency` never applies at this scope — the script never emits a missing-counterpart FAIL here, because there is nothing to pair by design.
+At **plugin/APM scope** there is no counterpart — the script instead checks the single file's frontmatter against the `apm-agent-allowlist` in `references/field-inventory.md`. Read that section for the current list rather than reciting one here; it is the authoritative source and it changes. As of 2026-08-14 it is `name`, `description`, `model`, `source_keys`, `disallowedTools` — `source_keys` is provenance metadata, not a provider-specific field, and is validated separately by `validate-provenance.sh` against `sources.md`; `disallowedTools` is a denylist, admitted because denying a tool by name is safe under `apm compile`'s verbatim copy in a way the `tools` allowlist is not (ADR-0016's 2026-08-14 amendment, and the rationale recorded alongside the list itself). Findings about missing fields, bad name format, name/filename-stem mismatch, empty body, or missing frontmatter → `### Structure`, same as project/user scope. Findings about any field outside the allowlist (e.g. `tools`, or any Claude-only/Copilot-only field carried over from a hand-edit) and body length → `### Provider safety` — but the dimension's meaning shifts here: it is no longer a CC-vs-Copilot field-leakage check, it's a vendor-neutral-field-allowlist check, since `apm compile` verbatim-copies this file's frontmatter to every target and there is no per-target integrator to reconcile a CC-only or Copilot-only field (ADR-0016). `### Pair consistency` never applies at this scope — the script never emits a missing-counterpart FAIL here, because there is nothing to pair by design.
 
 `vale-wrap.sh` ships inside this skill's own `scripts/` — resolve it relative to this skill's directory the same way `scripts/validate.sh` is resolved above, so the invocation works whether this skill is running from this repo or from an installed plugin cache. Pass no `--config`: handed none, the wrapper loads its own sibling `assets/vale/.vale.ini`, located from the script's path rather than from the cwd. Adding an explicit relative `--config` breaks exactly the case the self-location covers — a resolved script path plus an unresolved config path yields `E100 Runtime error ... does not exist`, exit 2, which the fallback below then misreads as "vale unavailable". At project/user scope, run it against both files of the pair (not just the one passed in); at plugin/APM scope, run it against the single file. `Kyberforge` applies to all of these files via the `**/agents/*.md` glob; `KyberforgeCopilot` applies to any `*.agent.md` file — including the plugin/APM-scope file, which already has that extension — via the `**/*.agent.md` glob, since its one rule (`Use proactively`) flags CC-specific phrasing that's meaningless in a vendor-neutral or Copilot description. Every Vale alert is a `FAIL` — all rules are graded `error` — so report each one in the `### Description` / `### Body` dimensions citing its rule ID (e.g. `KyberforgeCopilot.ProactivePhrase`). Skip and fall back to Step 2 judgment if the `vale` binary is unavailable. If Vale reports `0 files` scanned, treat the pass as NOT RUN — not as clean — and fall back to full Step 2 judgment for the dimensions it would have covered.
 
 `validate-provenance.sh` operates at plugin/APM scope only — it walks up from the agent file's directory the same way `validate.sh` does (nearest ancestor `apm.yml` with a top-level `type:` field; skip a `type:`-less marketplace-only `apm.yml`; stop at `.git` or the filesystem root) and exits 0 silently if that walk doesn't land on a package root, or when no provenance data exists. When it does apply, it validates the chain between the single file's own `source_keys` and the package-scoped `sources.md` (package root — see ADR-0010). Note FAILs from this script for the `### Provenance` dimension — surface them verbatim with Why and Fix.
 
-If the scripts cannot run (Bash denied, python3 unavailable), perform checks manually. At project/user scope: counterpart file exists, required fields present (`name`, `description`, non-empty body), `name` is kebab-case, Copilot CLI `.agent.md` `name` must match filename stem (CC files are exempt — the CC platform does not require name to match filename), no `FILL IN:` placeholders, no CC-only fields in Copilot file, no Copilot-only fields in CC file (read `references/field-inventory.md` for the authoritative field lists). At plugin/APM scope: required fields present (`name`, `description`, non-empty body), `name` is kebab-case and matches the filename stem, no `FILL IN:` placeholders, no frontmatter field outside `name`/`description`/`model`/`source_keys` (read the `apm-agent-allowlist` section of `references/field-inventory.md`; `source_keys` carries provenance metadata, checked separately by `validate-provenance.sh` against `sources.md`).
+If the scripts cannot run (Bash denied, python3 unavailable), perform checks manually. At project/user scope: counterpart file exists, required fields present (`name`, `description`, non-empty body), `name` is kebab-case, Copilot CLI `.agent.md` `name` must match filename stem (CC files are exempt — the CC platform does not require name to match filename), no `FILL IN:` placeholders, no CC-only fields in Copilot file, no Copilot-only fields in CC file (read `references/field-inventory.md` for the authoritative field lists). At plugin/APM scope: required fields present (`name`, `description`, non-empty body), `name` is kebab-case and matches the filename stem, no `FILL IN:` placeholders, no frontmatter field outside the allowlist — read the `apm-agent-allowlist` section of `references/field-inventory.md` for it, do not work from memory (`source_keys` carries provenance metadata, checked separately by `validate-provenance.sh` against `sources.md`).
 
 ## Step 2 — Qualitative checks