docs: correct the claims this review found false

AGENTS.md told an offline agent to push with SKIP=apm-marketplace-check and
asserted that hook was "the only one whose failure mode is 'no network'".
Running all 12 pre-push hooks under a network namespace shows two fail, for
one shared cause: apm-pack-check-clean resolves the same remote entry. An
exact pin does not remove the ls-remote, so both hooks are named now.

AGENTS.md also said everything in a plugin root except .apm/ is generated.
Plugin roots carry hand-authored README.md, docs/, bin/, sources.md and
.mcp.json, so an agent would hunt for an .apm/ source that does not exist or
refuse the edit. The rule is positional: immunity belongs to the plugin root,
and anything inside a mirrored directory is still rm -rf'd.

ADR-0017 said apm strips a hooks field. The real loop is (agents, skills,
commands, instructions) -- hooks absent, instructions never mentioned -- and
it can never fire, because synthesize_plugin_json_from_apm_yml only emits the
eight identity fields. The decision stands; the mechanism was overstated. Its
mcpServers amendment is rewritten for the pointer payload and now records the
real reason: inlining bypassed apm's credential sanitizer.

ADR-0015's owner.email and version-pin passages are corrected against the apm
source, and ADR-0016 gains the disallowedTools amendment. agent-audit's
allowlist is data, so it gains disallowedTools too -- the ADR and the
validator that enforces it had come apart.

architecture.md described a root CLAUDE.md that imports two files (it imports
one, plus an RTK block) and pointed at an ADR index that does not exist.
Seven skill READMEs listed tests/ files the mirror strips, promising installed
users files their install lacks; those rows are marked source-only, with the
depth-4 template tests explicitly called out as surviving. And
plugins/kyberforge/hooks/README.md, deleted during the conversion and
preserved nowhere, is restored to a path the mirror does not own -- verified
by running a sync against a scratch copy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X7GvKuJfy2WrdBmUttV4DT

plugins/kyberforge/.apm/skills/agent-audit/scripts/validate.sh

@@ -241,10 +241,13 @@ def check_apm_agent_file(fpath, allowlist, stem):
         fail(f"frontmatter still contains template HTML comments (<!-- ... -->) "
              f"— delete them before shipping — {local_fname}")
 
-    # Allowlist: only name/description/model may appear — no tools, no
-    # Claude-only or Copilot-only fields. apm compile verbatim-copies
-    # frontmatter to every target, so anything else is unsafe on at least
-    # one harness (ADR-0016).
+    # Allowlist: the permitted keys are data, read at load time from
+    # references/field-inventory.md's `## apm-agent-allowlist` section — do not
+    # restate them here, or this comment goes stale the next time that line
+    # changes. apm compile verbatim-copies frontmatter to every target, so a key
+    # outside the list is unsafe on at least one harness (ADR-0016). Note the
+    # list admits denylist-shaped restrictions (disallowedTools) but never
+    # allowlist-shaped ones (tools), whose value shape differs per harness.
     fm_keys = get_frontmatter_keys(fm)
     for key in sorted(fm_keys):
         if key not in allowlist: