docs: trim repeated boilerplate in git, gitea, and bin skills

Finding 13: five blocks of near-identical wording were repeated across
skills within a plugin — the gitea "resolve owner and repo" step (5
skills), the 404-masks-403 note (6 files), the manual pagination
explanation (8 files), the git plugin's main/master force-push refusal
(7 files, some with multiple internal restatements), and the bin
skills' domain-glossary/ADR paragraph (5 skills). Tightened each
instance in place — same meaning, fewer words — rather than extracting
to a shared file, which ADR-0014's one-file-per-skill install
constraint rules out. Left the three git skills' structured-result
JSON shapes alone (coupled to the separate, out-of-scope git-orchestrate
merge candidate, finding 19).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YR2CjVumUbEGWcMikcoXBD
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-12 19:48:19 +00:00
parent f5e4d0d082
commit 6cfc3577e2
49 changed files with 128 additions and 135 deletions

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@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ size. No recursion, no content, no `sha`.
`get_repository_tree(owner, repo, tree_sha, recursive)`. Set `recursive: true` to walk
subdirectories in one call.
The response sets `truncated: true` when one page does not hold every entry. Page through with
`page`/`per_page` (defaults `1` and `30`) until a page returns fewer entries than `per_page`.
The response sets `truncated: true` when one page doesn't hold every entry — page with
`page`/`per_page` (defaults `1`/`30`) until a page returns fewer than `per_page`.
## Neither listing is a SHA source for a write
@@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ the canonical path for a write's SHA: one call returns the decoded content and t
## A 404 that is really a 403
These reads gate on `write:repository`, not on read access alone, and some Gitea endpoints answer
an under-scoped token with 404 instead of 403 so they do not leak whether the resource exists. A
404 on a path you are confident about is a scope problem until proven otherwise — check the token's
configured scopes before concluding the file or directory does not exist.
These reads gate on `write:repository`; an under-scoped token gets 404 instead of 403 so the
endpoint doesn't leak whether the resource exists. On a path you're confident about, check token
scope before concluding it doesn't exist.