Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
cf625229f7 fix(scripts): detect the .apm/ content the mirror loses silently
apm's bundle exporter drops symlinks entirely, so a symlink under .apm/ never
reaches the mirror -- and no gate could see it, because every existing check
diffs the live mirror against a bundle-derived copy and both sides lack the
file. It is an absence with nothing left to mismatch against, the only class of
.apm/ content that vanishes without a trace. check_apm_symlinks reads the .apm/
source tree, where the loss is visible, and fails both modes. Reported rather
than resolved: dereferencing would make a real sync emit content the bundle does
not contain, which is the reimplementation ADR-0017 rejects.

--check --all could also pass having verified fewer plugins than the marketplace
lists: a plugin whose .apm/ had gone was SKIPped rather than counted, and the
earlier floor only caught zero. The count is now checked against the marketplace's
own local-package list. There is no exempt state -- ADR-0015 makes .apm/ the sole
authoring source for every local plugin, so a listed plugin without one is drift.

On the Copilot hooks gap, the decision is to document, not implement. Copilot
declares no hooks path and apm emits none, which looks like the mcpServers case
-- but that exception holds because .mcp.json is one host-agnostic format both
ecosystems read, so a pointer to it is true whatever it contains. Hooks have no
shared format: Claude expects nested matcher groups under PascalCase events,
Copilot requires version: 1, camelCase, and a bash/powershell split. apm merges
.apm/hooks/*.json into exactly one file, at Claude's convention path. A pointer
would assert a Claude-shaped file is Copilot-shaped -- an incomplete manifest
traded for a wrong one -- and it is not inert today either, since {"hooks": {}}
lacks Copilot's mandatory version key. A test pins the decision, so restoring the
pointer fails until someone confronts the schema mismatch.

Tests: 77 -> 92 assertions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X7GvKuJfy2WrdBmUttV4DT
2026-08-14 14:20:47 +00:00
f4bb1cf4e5 docs: finish reconciling the agent write fence across the toolchain
The previous round taught agent-audit's validator to permit disallowedTools but
left the skill that writes agents still forbidding it, in six places. Running
agent-author on any of the three fenced orchestrators would have stripped the
fence, and nothing would have caught it: the validator's allowlist is a permit
list, so an absent field passes. The template was the worst of them, since its
comment is copied verbatim into every new plugin-scope agent.

Where a list had to be restated it is now a pointer to field-inventory.md's
apm-agent-allowlist instead -- the same data validate.sh reads -- because a
roster copied into a template goes stale one step further out than the roster
itself. Where the text has to teach something it teaches the shape rule rather
than the exception: tools is an allowlist whose vocabulary differs per harness,
so verbatim copy makes one value wrong on one target; disallowedTools is a
denylist, where an unrecognised name denies nothing, so the worst case is a
missing fence rather than a wrongly granted capability.

ADR-0016's amendment claimed an unrecognised key is inert on Copilot while the
same ADR's Context says that behaviour is unconfirmed by research -- asserting
as settled the exact thing it flags as unknown, and justifying it with apm's
compile-time behaviour, which says nothing about Copilot's runtime. It is
rewritten into labelled tiers: confirmed for Claude Code with citations,
inferred by analogy for Copilot with the analogy's limits stated, unverified
where it is unverified, and the residual risk accepted explicitly with its
blast radius. It also no longer claims to restore a write sandbox: the denylist
does not deny Bash, which these agents inherit and legitimately need.

docs/hooks.md called the old root hooks.json a stale sync artifact -- it was
added in the plugin's creating commit and pointed at by main's Copilot manifest
-- and claimed both ecosystems now resolve hooks/hooks.json. Copilot does not:
its hooks field has no default and no compiled manifest declares one, so it
resolves nothing. Recorded as the gap it is, with re-injection noted as a
follow-up rather than asserted away. Its event list is marked partial.

Also: new-agent.bats asserted a hardcoded four-field allowlist and would have
rejected a scaffolded agent carrying the field the ADR now blesses; it reads
field-inventory.md too. And ADR-0016's premise that Claude's tools: is
space-separated was wrong -- it takes a comma-separated string or a YAML list.
The incompatibility with Copilot is the vocabulary, not the punctuation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X7GvKuJfy2WrdBmUttV4DT
2026-08-14 12:30:30 +00:00
430f46b8e8 docs: correct the claims this review found false
AGENTS.md told an offline agent to push with SKIP=apm-marketplace-check and
asserted that hook was "the only one whose failure mode is 'no network'".
Running all 12 pre-push hooks under a network namespace shows two fail, for
one shared cause: apm-pack-check-clean resolves the same remote entry. An
exact pin does not remove the ls-remote, so both hooks are named now.

AGENTS.md also said everything in a plugin root except .apm/ is generated.
Plugin roots carry hand-authored README.md, docs/, bin/, sources.md and
.mcp.json, so an agent would hunt for an .apm/ source that does not exist or
refuse the edit. The rule is positional: immunity belongs to the plugin root,
and anything inside a mirrored directory is still rm -rf'd.

ADR-0017 said apm strips a hooks field. The real loop is (agents, skills,
commands, instructions) -- hooks absent, instructions never mentioned -- and
it can never fire, because synthesize_plugin_json_from_apm_yml only emits the
eight identity fields. The decision stands; the mechanism was overstated. Its
mcpServers amendment is rewritten for the pointer payload and now records the
real reason: inlining bypassed apm's credential sanitizer.

ADR-0015's owner.email and version-pin passages are corrected against the apm
source, and ADR-0016 gains the disallowedTools amendment. agent-audit's
allowlist is data, so it gains disallowedTools too -- the ADR and the
validator that enforces it had come apart.

architecture.md described a root CLAUDE.md that imports two files (it imports
one, plus an RTK block) and pointed at an ADR index that does not exist.
Seven skill READMEs listed tests/ files the mirror strips, promising installed
users files their install lacks; those rows are marked source-only, with the
depth-4 template tests explicitly called out as surviving. And
plugins/kyberforge/hooks/README.md, deleted during the conversion and
preserved nowhere, is restored to a path the mirror does not own -- verified
by running a sync against a scratch copy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X7GvKuJfy2WrdBmUttV4DT
2026-08-14 11:04:56 +00:00