The previous round taught agent-audit's validator to permit disallowedTools but
left the skill that writes agents still forbidding it, in six places. Running
agent-author on any of the three fenced orchestrators would have stripped the
fence, and nothing would have caught it: the validator's allowlist is a permit
list, so an absent field passes. The template was the worst of them, since its
comment is copied verbatim into every new plugin-scope agent.
Where a list had to be restated it is now a pointer to field-inventory.md's
apm-agent-allowlist instead -- the same data validate.sh reads -- because a
roster copied into a template goes stale one step further out than the roster
itself. Where the text has to teach something it teaches the shape rule rather
than the exception: tools is an allowlist whose vocabulary differs per harness,
so verbatim copy makes one value wrong on one target; disallowedTools is a
denylist, where an unrecognised name denies nothing, so the worst case is a
missing fence rather than a wrongly granted capability.
ADR-0016's amendment claimed an unrecognised key is inert on Copilot while the
same ADR's Context says that behaviour is unconfirmed by research -- asserting
as settled the exact thing it flags as unknown, and justifying it with apm's
compile-time behaviour, which says nothing about Copilot's runtime. It is
rewritten into labelled tiers: confirmed for Claude Code with citations,
inferred by analogy for Copilot with the analogy's limits stated, unverified
where it is unverified, and the residual risk accepted explicitly with its
blast radius. It also no longer claims to restore a write sandbox: the denylist
does not deny Bash, which these agents inherit and legitimately need.
docs/hooks.md called the old root hooks.json a stale sync artifact -- it was
added in the plugin's creating commit and pointed at by main's Copilot manifest
-- and claimed both ecosystems now resolve hooks/hooks.json. Copilot does not:
its hooks field has no default and no compiled manifest declares one, so it
resolves nothing. Recorded as the gap it is, with re-injection noted as a
follow-up rather than asserted away. Its event list is marked partial.
Also: new-agent.bats asserted a hardcoded four-field allowlist and would have
rejected a scaffolded agent carrying the field the ADR now blesses; it reads
field-inventory.md too. And ADR-0016's premise that Claude's tools: is
space-separated was wrong -- it takes a comma-separated string or a YAML list.
The incompatibility with Copilot is the vocabulary, not the punctuation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X7GvKuJfy2WrdBmUttV4DT
AGENTS.md told an offline agent to push with SKIP=apm-marketplace-check and
asserted that hook was "the only one whose failure mode is 'no network'".
Running all 12 pre-push hooks under a network namespace shows two fail, for
one shared cause: apm-pack-check-clean resolves the same remote entry. An
exact pin does not remove the ls-remote, so both hooks are named now.
AGENTS.md also said everything in a plugin root except .apm/ is generated.
Plugin roots carry hand-authored README.md, docs/, bin/, sources.md and
.mcp.json, so an agent would hunt for an .apm/ source that does not exist or
refuse the edit. The rule is positional: immunity belongs to the plugin root,
and anything inside a mirrored directory is still rm -rf'd.
ADR-0017 said apm strips a hooks field. The real loop is (agents, skills,
commands, instructions) -- hooks absent, instructions never mentioned -- and
it can never fire, because synthesize_plugin_json_from_apm_yml only emits the
eight identity fields. The decision stands; the mechanism was overstated. Its
mcpServers amendment is rewritten for the pointer payload and now records the
real reason: inlining bypassed apm's credential sanitizer.
ADR-0015's owner.email and version-pin passages are corrected against the apm
source, and ADR-0016 gains the disallowedTools amendment. agent-audit's
allowlist is data, so it gains disallowedTools too -- the ADR and the
validator that enforces it had come apart.
architecture.md described a root CLAUDE.md that imports two files (it imports
one, plus an RTK block) and pointed at an ADR index that does not exist.
Seven skill READMEs listed tests/ files the mirror strips, promising installed
users files their install lacks; those rows are marked source-only, with the
depth-4 template tests explicitly called out as surviving. And
plugins/kyberforge/hooks/README.md, deleted during the conversion and
preserved nowhere, is restored to a path the mirror does not own -- verified
by running a sync against a scratch copy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X7GvKuJfy2WrdBmUttV4DT
field-inventory.md's apm-agent-allowlist and validate.sh's runtime
check already included source_keys as a 4th allowed field, and the
apm-agent.md template already instructed authors to add it for
provenance tracking — but SKILL.md (x2), README.md, ADR-0016, and
deployment-modes.md still described the allowlist as name/description/
model, "nothing else". The template itself even contradicted its own
source_keys guidance with a header claiming "ONLY the three fields
below — full stop" directly above it.
Updates all six locations to document source_keys as the intentional
4th field, resolving the contradiction.
A fresh /code-review of the APM-native authoring retarget (PR #93) found
several correctness bugs beyond the ones already fixed on this branch:
- new-agent.sh silently walked a marker-less subdirectory under $HOME up
to user scope, contradicting its own usage text ("user scope is checked
directly, no walk-up") and risking scaffolding into shared global
~/.claude or ~/.copilot directories instead of the intended local path.
- The hand-copied apm.yml type: manifest detector in new-agent.sh and
new-skill.sh accepted mismatched quotes (e.g. `type: "skill'`) that
validate.sh's regex correctly rejects, and silently dropped a final
apm.yml line lacking a trailing newline — causing the scaffolder and
validator to disagree on scope for identical input.
- Plugin-scope agent frontmatter could still contain the apm-agent.md
template's HTML comments at ship time with no audit signal, yet
apm compile copies frontmatter verbatim and <!-- --> breaks YAML
parsing on both downstream harnesses.
- ADR-0016 asserted agent-audit already implements a SUGGESTION heuristic
for tool-restriction-needing plugin-scope agents; it doesn't.
- agent-audit/README.md still described the old plugin-pair model this
PR replaced with a single-file allowlist model.
- validate.sh's project/user-scope CC-only/Copilot-only field checks and
counterpart-missing check lost their only test coverage when the old
plugin-pair fixture was deleted.
Also replaces an echo-into-sed two-value parse (4 forks per call) with a
single space-separated echo + read in both scaffolders.
Regression tests added for every fix above, including one for a bug this
pass introduced and the test suite caught: an initial two-line
echo + `read` attempt silently dropped the second value, since `read`
consumes only one line regardless of embedded newlines.
Full suite: 158 bats tests, 39 shell-script tests, 12/12 summary
categories, 0 failures.
Refs: #89, #93
#89's grilling session surfaced a real upstream gap: APM's agent
primitive has no per-target compile integrator, so tools: and every
Claude-only field (isolation, maxTurns, effort, memory, permissionMode)
would verbatim-copy into Copilot's file with an incompatible or
unrecognized shape. Omitting them entirely is the only option that
never ships a wrong value to a real harness.
Scoped to plugin-scope agent-author only — project/user scope keep
today's Claude+Copilot pair model unchanged. Partially supersedes
ADR-0005 and ADR-0008's plugin-scope clauses (addenda appended to
both); ADR-0009's field-inventory.md mechanism is unaffected, only
its plugin-scope content shape changes.
Refs: #89
