Generated output, not authored content: scripts/sync-plugin-content.sh --all. Claude Code has no .apm/ awareness, so this compiled mirror must track .apm/ or the check-plugin-content-sync pre-push hook reports drift. Deferred to a single commit at the end of the wave on purpose. sync_dir runs rm -rf before every copy, so running it while seven agents were editing the same plugin would have raced them; agents were told not to sync for that reason. Refs #99
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source_keys
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Reading files, directories and trees
All three read calls select what to read with ref — a branch name, tag, or commit SHA. On
get_repository_tree the same value goes in tree_sha despite the name.
Single file
get_file_contents(owner, repo, ref, path).
The response carries the file's sha at the top level, not nested under content. That field
is the write-ready SHA, so capture it whenever a write may follow. Content comes back
base64-encoded — decode it. Pass withLines: true only when you need numbered lines to quote
specific lines back to the user; omit it for a normal content fetch.
One directory level
get_dir_contents(owner, repo, ref, path) returns the immediate entries only — name, path, type,
size. No recursion, no content, no sha.
Whole repository tree
get_repository_tree(owner, repo, tree_sha, recursive). Set recursive: true to walk
subdirectories in one call.
The response sets truncated: true when one page does not hold every entry. Page through with
page/per_page (defaults 1 and 30) until a page returns fewer entries than per_page.
Neither listing is a SHA source for a write
get_dir_contents entries carry no sha at all. get_repository_tree entries do carry a blob or
tree hash, but reaching it costs an extra round trip and returns no content. get_file_contents is
the canonical path for a write's SHA: one call returns the decoded content and the write-ready
sha together.
A 404 that is really a 403
These reads gate on write:repository, not on read access alone, and some Gitea endpoints answer
an under-scoped token with 404 instead of 403 so they do not leak whether the resource exists. A
404 on a path you are confident about is a scope problem until proven otherwise — check the token's
configured scopes before concluding the file or directory does not exist.