Defame1297
f4bb1cf4e5
The previous round taught agent-audit's validator to permit disallowedTools but left the skill that writes agents still forbidding it, in six places. Running agent-author on any of the three fenced orchestrators would have stripped the fence, and nothing would have caught it: the validator's allowlist is a permit list, so an absent field passes. The template was the worst of them, since its comment is copied verbatim into every new plugin-scope agent. Where a list had to be restated it is now a pointer to field-inventory.md's apm-agent-allowlist instead -- the same data validate.sh reads -- because a roster copied into a template goes stale one step further out than the roster itself. Where the text has to teach something it teaches the shape rule rather than the exception: tools is an allowlist whose vocabulary differs per harness, so verbatim copy makes one value wrong on one target; disallowedTools is a denylist, where an unrecognised name denies nothing, so the worst case is a missing fence rather than a wrongly granted capability. ADR-0016's amendment claimed an unrecognised key is inert on Copilot while the same ADR's Context says that behaviour is unconfirmed by research -- asserting as settled the exact thing it flags as unknown, and justifying it with apm's compile-time behaviour, which says nothing about Copilot's runtime. It is rewritten into labelled tiers: confirmed for Claude Code with citations, inferred by analogy for Copilot with the analogy's limits stated, unverified where it is unverified, and the residual risk accepted explicitly with its blast radius. It also no longer claims to restore a write sandbox: the denylist does not deny Bash, which these agents inherit and legitimately need. docs/hooks.md called the old root hooks.json a stale sync artifact -- it was added in the plugin's creating commit and pointed at by main's Copilot manifest -- and claimed both ecosystems now resolve hooks/hooks.json. Copilot does not: its hooks field has no default and no compiled manifest declares one, so it resolves nothing. Recorded as the gap it is, with re-injection noted as a follow-up rather than asserted away. Its event list is marked partial. Also: new-agent.bats asserted a hardcoded four-field allowlist and would have rejected a scaffolded agent carrying the field the ADR now blesses; it reads field-inventory.md too. And ADR-0016's premise that Claude's tools: is space-separated was wrong -- it takes a comma-separated string or a YAML list. The incompatibility with Copilot is the vocabulary, not the punctuation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X7GvKuJfy2WrdBmUttV4DT
assets/
templates/
Annotated agent definition templates copied by scripts/new-agent.sh when scaffolding a new agent.
claude-code.md— Claude Code agent definition template (project/user scope). Includes all supported frontmatter fields (required and optional) with inline guidance comments andFILL IN:placeholders.copilot.agent.md.template— Copilot CLI agent definition template (CLI format, project/user scope). Excludes cloud/IDE-only fields (target,user-invocable,disable-model-invocation,mcp-servers) and Claude Code-only fields. Uses Copilot tool aliases (execute,read,edit,search,agent,web).apm-agent.md— Vendor-neutral APM agent definition template (plugin/APM scope). Frontmatter is limited to theapm-agent-allowlistsection ofagent-audit'sreferences/field-inventory.md— the authoritative list, read from there as data byagent-audit'svalidate.sh; this file deliberately does not restate it. Notoolsand no Claude-only knobs, sinceapm compilecopies frontmatter verbatim to both the Claude Code and Copilot CLI targets with no per-target integrator;disallowedToolsis scaffolded as an opt-in comment because a denylist, unlike thetoolsallowlist, survives that copy (ADR-0016 and its 2026-08-14 amendment).